Managing Dialogue in Terms of Belief and Acceptance by Caruana, Louis
  84
Managing Dialogue in Terms of Belief and Acceptance  
Louis Caruana, Rome 
We often consider dialogue an interaction between two 
individuals or groups with different opinions about some-
thing. In simple terms, the two parties in constructive 
dialogue engage in conversation so as to become more 
transparent to each other, and, through that very process, 
to themselves. If the difference of opinion is not resolved, 
or is not put aside as irrelevant, it can often be reduced to 
a set of statements that express a contradiction. After 
some time, it becomes obvious that one party holds that P 
while the other holds that ~P. From this simple observa-
tion, it follows that the usual attempt to establish harmony 
between the different parties in dialogue by insisting that 
each should include the other’s point of view is unsatis-
factory. The problem is that enlarging one’s horizon to 
include the other’s point of view very often results in an 
inconsistent set of beliefs, namely a set that includes both 
P and ~P. In any discussion on dialogue, therefore, it is 
crucial to be clear about the nature of contradictions in 
one’s set of beliefs and to have some strategy about how 
to handle inconsistency. In this paper, I will proceed in two 
steps. In the first, I will indicate how some attempts at 
trying to manage contradictions in terms of ontology 
remain unsatisfactory. In the second step, I will introduce 
and evaluate another way in terms of belief and accep-
tance.  
1. Managing Contradictions in  
Terms of Ontology 
Standard logic cannot handle inconsistency. The major 
threat from admitting contradiction within a set of beliefs is 
that of explosion. As can be shown quite easily, when a 
set of propositions contains even one single proposition 
together with its negation, then it will be possible to deduce 
any proposition whatsoever.1 This kind of explosion occurs 
not only in the case of sets of beliefs whose elements are 
distinct and clearly evident. It occurs also for sets of beliefs 
considered in conjunction with all the logical conse-
quences of those beliefs. It is customary to call a set of 
axiomatic beliefs together with all their logical conse-
quences a theory. So even a theory is prone to explosion 
because digging below the surface of the axioms will 
enable the deduction of practically any proposition what-
soever. 
It is interesting to recall Aristotle’s discussion on contra-
diction, in Metaphysics Book Γ, which contains the famous 
line: ‘A thing cannot at the same time be and not be’ 
(Aristotle 1941, 996b30). This formulation is related to the 
being of a thing, rather than to what one can say about the 
thing. Following Aristotle, many have considered the 
principle of contradiction as valid for all being. In Aristote-
lian metaphysics, it is considered a primary principle, an 
indispensable tool, because it allows the apprehension of 
being in its intrinsic intelligibility. Since it excludes its own 
negation, it cannot be denied, but neither can it be derived. 
This means that, for a standard ontology, such as the one 
assumed by many philosophers in the course of history 
ranging from Aristotle to the early Wittgenstein, there are 
                                                     
1 Starting from the premise P that A & ∼A, one can see how any other proposi-
tion follows because of the following simple argument. For all A, A ⇒ (A or B). 
From P, however, we hold also that ∼A. (A or B) & ∼A ⇒ B. Therefore we can 
conclude that B, for any B whatsoever. 
two laws. The first, the law of excluded middle, holds that, 
of a pair of propositions P and ∼P, at least one obtains. 
This fact is classically expressed by the phrase tertium non 
datur. The second law, that of contradiction holds that, of a 
pair of propositions P and ∼P, at most one obtains. 
Moreover, there are indications that Aristotle wasn’t 
ignorant of the explosive nature of even a single inconsis-
tency in one’s belief system. For instance, he claims that ‘if 
words have no meaning, our reasoning with one another, 
and indeed with ourselves, has been annihilated; for it is 
impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one 
thing’ (Aristotle 1941, 1006b 8-10; cf.: Thomas Aquinas 
1964-1981, 1a 2ae, Q 94, art. 2; Dancy 1975). 
The upshot is that standard logic is explosive in the 
presence of inconsistency. In other words, inconsistency is 
not a matter of degree. You cannot have some of it, or 
more of it. One instance of inconsistency within a theory 
contaminates and destabilises the system completely. 
This observation, however, does not help much in my 
project of giving an account of the dialogue situation in its 
complexity. In normal practice, an individual often seems 
capable of endorsing a set of beliefs that is rendered 
inconsistent because of that individual’s inclusion of 
another individual’s beliefs. Normal people are somewhat 
immune to logical explosion. They seem capable of 
containing various kinds of inconsistency within their belief 
systems. Their rationality seems to have a certain flexibility 
that helps them put such inconsistencies on hold, as it 
were, until further information is available.  
It was probably such everyday skills that gave rise to 
some peculiar remarks in the writings of the later Wittgen-
stein. For instance, during one of his early discussions with 
members of the Vienna Circle, he is claimed to have made 
the following prediction: ‘I am prepared to predict that there 
will be mathematical investigations of calculi containing 
contradictions and people will pride themselves on having 
emancipated themselves from consistency too.’ (Goldstein 
1989, 540). In his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathe-
matics, he writes: ‘But you can’t allow a contradiction to 
stand: Why not? We do sometimes use this form in our 
talk, of course not often – but one could imagine a tech-
nique of language in which it was a regular instrument. It 
might for example be said of an object in motion that it 
existed and did not exist in this place; change might be 
expressed by means of a contradiction’ (Wittgenstein 
1967, V 8). 2 
Following Wittgenstein’s suggestion, some have tried to 
manage inconsistency by constructing what may be called 
a hyper-ontology (Rescher et al. 1980). The basic idea is 
to have an ontology that is perforated at some points. This 
means that, as regards these points, one can neither hold 
that P nor that ~P. Such an artificial world can also have 
another feature. It could also be superimposed, in the 
sense that it contains points about which one can hold 
both that P and that ~P. This is an ontological way of 
ensuring that contradictions do not contaminate the entire 
system. Although interesting and perhaps applicable in 
                                                     
2 Wittgenstein’s remarks bearing on contradiction are scattered in a number 
places. For example Wittgenstein 1967, II 78, 81, 82; III 56-60; III 87; V 12, 13, 
21, 26, 28. For further details, see Priest et al. 1989; Priest et al. 1993; Priest 
1998. 




some areas of modern science, it leaves a lot to be desired 
in the way of practical usefulness. The hyper-ontology it 
depends on seems to be completely ad hoc.3  
A better way of examining how to deal with inconsis-
tency is in terms of propositional attitudes. Are there 
various ways in which we endorse a proposition?  
2. Managing Contradictions in Terms of 
Belief and Acceptance 
My proposal is to see whether drawing a distinction 
between belief and acceptance can be useful in under-
standing dialogue situations that boil down to a contradic-
tion. One of the best studies of belief and acceptance to 
my knowledge is that of L. Jonathan Cohen (1992). He 
starts by situating René Descartes and David Hume as the 
two opposite extreme positions, the former holding that we 
acquire knowledge ultimately by a voluntary judgement, 
the latter, on the contrary, holding that knowledge is 
acquired by involuntary growth of cognitive feeling. The 
correct distinction between belief and acceptance must 
take into consideration the complexity of the issue sliding 
neither to one side nor the other. The essential difference 
occurs because belief needs to be seen as a disposition to 
feel that a proposition is true. for instance, I may have a 
disposition to feel that eating too many peanuts will cause 
me heartburn. Another way of talking about this state of 
affairs is to say that I believe peanuts cause me heartburn, 
and I show this in my behaviour. On the contrary, accep-
tance needs to be seen as a deliberate act, or a policy for 
reasoning, for example the policy of considering a given 
proposition a premise for further reasoning. ‘“Belief” carries 
no conceptual implications about reasoning, “acceptance” 
carries none about feelings’ (Cohen 1992, 5).  
According to this distinction, since belief is a disposition, 
it may be invisible until the appropriate moment comes 
when it becomes evident. My disposition to feel that a 
given proposition is true or false is only evident when my 
attention is turned to that proposition. For instance, when 
faced with something I never directly thought of before, 
say when faced with the proposition ‘the world contains a 
lot of evil but ultimately truth and goodness will prevail’, 
then I will discover where my disposition leads me. It may 
lead me to realise that I believe it, or it may lead me to 
realise that I don’t. Acceptance is different. It is a deliber-
ate and conscious operation of choosing a proposition as a 
starting point. This deliberate act can even go against my 
personal feelings. Accepting that P means taking P as a 
premise; in other words, taking P as true for the sake of 
the argument, whether one feels that P is true or not.  
In a few paragraphs of Cohen’s chapter one § 6, there is 
a mention of the problem of inconsistency in terms of belief 
and acceptance. It is this part that interests me most. In a 
nutshell, Cohen claims that belief that P and belief that ~P 
can co-exist within the same individual as a turmoil of 
feelings or inclinations. This is only human, given our 
considerable variety of natural tendencies fixed upon us by 
previous educational conditioning. On the contrary, 
acceptance that P and acceptance that ~P can co-exist 
within the same individual only when that person is 
manifestly lacking in rationality. Since acceptance is 
voluntary, such a person will come across as someone 
annoyingly absurd. In Cohen’s own words: ‘Because belief 
is not deductively closed, it is not necessarily an intellec-
tual disaster if a person does have an inconsistency 
                                                     
3 I discuss the prospects of their proposal with respect to Wittgenstein’s project 
in Caruana forthcoming. 
between some of his beliefs. But for acceptance the 
analogous situation may be disastrous’ (Cohen, 1992, 36). 
Consider now a simple case of dialogue, say, between 
her and me. We disagree on the truth-value of P. I take P 
to be true. She, as far as I can see, takes P to be false. My 
basic proposal is to uncover the subtle but important 
difference between the two situations: 
(S1)  I accept that she believes that ~P  
(S2)  I accept that she accepts that ~P 
These are just two of the many possible combinations. For 
each protagonist of the dialogue, there are two possible 
options, made available by the introduction of the distinc-
tion between belief and acceptance. Of all the permuta-
tions possible, the most significant pair is the one repre-
sented by S1 and S2. 
S1 is practically saying that I accept that her disagree-
ment with me issues from a belief. It issues, therefore, 
from her disposition to feel that P is false. Describing my 
situation as S1 enables me to hold that she holds that ~P 
not because she deliberately considers it a premise for her 
reasoning, but because of the way she is conditioned by 
her upbringing. S1 offers me, therefore, the possibility of 
thinking how she endorses ~P without being directly and 
consciously responsible of doing so.  
The appearance of a clear contradiction threatening my 
endorsing what she holds is not there any longer. Such a 
naked contradiction emerges only when the situation is 
described as S2. It emerges because both my proposi-
tional attitude towards P and hers about ~P are on the 
same level, namely that of acceptance. Accepting both P 
and ~P will result in clear inconsistency. As distinct from 
this, the possibility described by S1 implies that dialogue 
may still continue.  
What are the merits of this proposal? There are at least 
two. Firstly, it does away with the worry of how to contain a 
contradiction within a set of beliefs. A fortiori, it does not 
need to understand dialogue in terms of a hyper-ontology 
designed specifically to show how one and the same 
rational person may hold both that P and that ~P. Sec-
ondly, it introduces a new level of dialogue, namely the 
level of self-examination. One is encouraged to be see 
whether one’s contribution to a dialogue is made up of 
propositions one believes or of propositions one accepts. 
In other words, it highlights the possibility that some 
aspects of a dialogue situation may be better understood 
on the level of feelings. Other aspects may be better 
understood on the level of strategies in reasoning. In the 
example above, as described by S1, I may hope that she 
realises that her believing that ~P should be overcome. In 
a parallel but opposite fashion, the same thing may be 
hoped by her about my realising that some of my beliefs 
should be overcome, if and when I become more aware of 
what I should rationally accept as a good starting point for 
correct reasoning. 
This account of a dialogue situation is richer than the 
one I started with. It is thus more responsible to real-life 
situations. It certainly does not tell us how to resolve a 
given conflict of opinions. It nevertheless allows interest-
ing, non-explosive ways of managing such a conflict. 
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